This story was originally published on RealMoney at 8:30 A.M. on Monday, April 27. Let's wade once more through the alphabet soup of crisis-initiated federal programs. This time, let's examine the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP).
This is the FDIC program established to help financial institutions borrow in the capital markets when activity had frozen. Note that while markets are seemingly on the mend, we are still trying to find the new "normal," so the program is useful for getting credit markets flowing and has been extended until the end of October. Of all the programs launched since last September, this could arguably be one of the most valuable and least controversial. However, Andrew Bary, Floyd Norris and others have been critical about these FDIC loan guarantees, whether or not these are a "sweet deal" for banks, whether or not these loans should be paid back and mature in order to "de-TARP" and so forth. This may be as misguided as those who view the AIG ( AIG) intervention as nothing more than a straight cash transfer to counterparties rather than fully seeking to understand the transactions beyond the sound bite. ( My previous piece on that received a lot of comments, both positive and negative. I particularly enjoyed the letter that said "Die!" -- received on Easter Sunday, no less.) The criticism has been that banks are still benefitting from government largesse with regards to being able to issue debt at advantageous costs, given the FDIC guarantee. To a certain extent that is true -- there is no denying that banks are able to issue debt at a cheaper cost than would be otherwise available; however, the relationship is much more symbiotic than parasitic. What people seem to gloss over is that the banks are paying an insurance premium to be able to participate in this program. The fees raised by the FDIC through the TLGP project to nearly $6.9 billion through April 13. This figure is worth mentioning because this is money that, if not needed to make good on the TLGP guarantee, will benefit the Deposit Insurance Fund. The DIF is what backs all of our bank deposits, so the funds raised through the TLGP can potentially help support the FDIC's larger mission.
Of course, in all of these programs, there is always the greater debate as to whether any of them should have existed in the first place. That is a really legitimate debate -- whether the government should have intervened at all to head off systemic risk. If that is the argument, fine -- I have no problem with a broader philosophical debate. But let's stop trying to jump to conclusions without considering all of the facts of a particular program.
The whole concept of an FDIC and providing insurance on bank deposits does bring back the question of why we got rid of Glass-Steagall. Maybe it wasn't such an outmoded idea after all...
The second set of premiums is a set of surcharges that were put in place in March. These surcharges are for debt issuances longer than one year, and for the second quarter (April 1 through June 30) are set at 10 basis points and 20 basis points, with the 20 basis points surcharge going to holding companies that pay the "special assessment."
After the second quarter, these surcharges will step up to 25 basis points and 50 basis points. These step ups are meant to wean issuers away from the program before the Oct. 31 cutoff. These surcharges go directly into the Deposit Insurance Fund. This is to illustrate the calculus for a debt issuer to compare its all-in spreads of issuing under TLGP and issuing without. Clearly a bank will "arbitrage" the difference if it is in its favor and forgo the program if it is not. If I am a bank, right now the break-even is 110 basis points in spread (100 basis points assessment plus 10 basis points surcharge), and if I am in the special assessment bracket, that number is 130 basis points (100 basis points assessment plus 10 basis points special assessment plus 20 basis points surcharge). These numbers will step up to 125 basis points and 160 basis points on July 1. Of course, if a financial institution wishes to issue debt with a maturity beyond Dec. 31, 2012, it must do so without the guarantee -- this was meant to facilitate liquidity on a temporary basis to get the credit markets flowing again.