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) -- Though many people -- even some non-bankers -- are tired of what they see as a solid 18 months of attacks on banks by Congress, regulators and the public, there is plenty of evidence to suggest we are just getting started.

While the

New York Times

went over well-trodden ground earlier this month with an investigation into

Goldman Sachs'

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role in the meltdown of


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, the newspaper appears to have done more damage with a somewhat newer line of inquiry: the role of Goldman in the current Greek debt crisis.

It seems Goldman helped Greece mask its debt from European regulators through certain sophisticated derivatives transactions, the


reported on Saturday. The article noted that

JPMorgan Chase

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performed similar wizardry of the books of the Italian government.

The Financial Times

followed up Monday, reporting that

The New York Times

article was prompting an investigation by European Union authorities into the Greek transaction. An additional followup, by

The New York Times'

Floyd Norris, compared the deals to one involving



came to light

several years ago.

As the sovereign debt crisis threatens to spread from Greece to other European countries, so, surely, will the web of culpability expand to ensnare other investment banks, not to mention provide fresh evidence of questionable transactions by those already implicated, which include not just Goldman and JPMorgan, but France's

BNP Paribas

, Germany's

Deutsche Bank

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, and two Greek banks,

EFG Eurobank


National Bank of Greece


Indeed, the revelations about banks helping clients rack up unsustainable debt loads are likely to multiply far beyond real estate and European sovereign debt. The particular genius of bankers during the securitization boom was their ability to find more and more uses for securitization.

Most of the focus of the crisis so far has been on real estate, but real estate securitization is old hat. Pooling mortgages together and dividing them into slices that could be sold as bonds was popularized by Salomon Brothers (now part of


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) in the 1970s, as we know from Michael Lewis' Wall Street classic,

Liar's Poker


By 2005, the practice had expanded to encompass credit card and auto loans, settlements from cigarette lawsuits, infrastructure projects, toll roads and life insurance policies, to name a few. In identifying scandals and linking them to Wall Street innovation, it would seem we still have plenty of ground to cover. Not to mention that even as we are trying to fully understand the causes of the last crisis, we are sowing the seeds for the next one.

Securitization took off after the tech bubble burst in large part because the Federal Reserve took short term interest rates very low and kept them there, making bond investors seek higher yielding places to stash their money. Securitized products looked safe, and offered higher yields than U.S. Treasuries.

Well, guess what? U.S. Treasuries still offer very low yields, and bond investors are still desperately in search of higher yields. There are plenty of signs the market for new securitizations is coming back to life. These instruments remain highly complex, which is one of the attractions for governments and companies that want to hide debt.

This desire to hide debt is far older than Wall Street, so you can expect it to stick around for a while, fueling a demand for products that satisfy that desire. In short, the securitization scandal is far from played out and other lines of inquiry have barely begun.

Take, for example, antitrust. The


suggested last month a wide-ranging investigation into anti-competitive banking practices could have several benefits, including better understanding of the causes of the financial crisis.

A conversation I

reported on some two weeks ago

between JPMorgan boss Jamie Dimon and Emilio Botin, his counterpart at

Banco Santander


, suggests an antitrust inquiry might prove enlightening indeed, as one has the impression the conversation between the two bank chiefs and their associates, while of great interest to antitrust scholars, was a fairly routine occurrence.

I imagine if JPMorgan executives had been concerned about the antitrust implications of such a conversation, that would not have described it so freely in an intercompany e-mail. It did not occur to them to be concerned because the financial services industry has operated in a regulation-free zone for so long, they seem to have lost all sense of perspective.

Surely that attitude is changing, but there is good reason to believe the changes are just getting underway.


Written by Dan Freed in New York.