Trump Tariffs Have Hurt U.S. Manufacturing Jobs


According to a Fed study, the effects so far of the U.S. tariff escalation have been a fall in U.S. manufacturing jobs

The hike in tariffs imposed by the United States against its major trading partners since early 2018 has been unprecedented in recent history. President Trump alluded to, among others, the goal of revitalizing jobs in the country’s manufacturing industry by protecting it from unfair trade practices of other countries, particularly China. However, according to a study by two Federal Reserve Bank staff – Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce – released last December 23, the effect so far has been just the opposite, i.e. a reduction in U.S. manufacturing employment!

Tariff escalation – and retaliation from those affected – from 2018 onwards took place in three stages. In February of that year, surcharges were imposed on imports of washing machines and solar panels, followed in March by others affecting steel and aluminum imports. China, the European Union, Canada, and Mexico responded with retaliation on U.S. exports. A third moment came with the sequence of tariffs on imports from China announced starting in April, always accompanied by Chinese retaliatory reactions against U.S. exports.

Chart 1, taken from the Fed study, depicts the escalation of U.S. import tariffs and retaliations since 2018, including the latest rounds currently suspended after the announcement of an incoming “phase one” U.S.-China trade deal.

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In addition to the Trump administration’s references to U.S. security issues and trade deficit reduction targets, with an emphasis on bilateral deficit cases, the resumption of domestic manufacturing employment had emerged as a promise since the electoral process. Tariffs would provide the opportunity for local production processes to take market shares occupied by foreign competitors. Higher product prices, whether imported or locally import-substituted, would be an acceptable and limited welfare cost offset by increases in manufacturing employment levels.

However, two other tariff impacts should also be considered. The imposition of tariffs on inputs and intermediate products leads to cost increases for those who use them, damaging their competitiveness domestically and externally. In addition, retaliation also affects the ability of domestic production to compete in the corresponding overseas markets.

Flaaen and Pierce estimated the weight of these effects at a very detailed sector level, namely the gain of local market shares against the burden of rising intermediate costs and overseas losses. The study comes to figures showing that the burden has outweighed the gains, with the positive contribution on employment driven by tariff protection being more than negatively offset by the impacts of rising input costs and retaliatory measures. In addition, it has led to increases in U.S. wholesale price levels.

The characteristics of industrial production as value chains integrating fragmented and geographically dispersed activities, particularly since the 1980s, explain why tariffs on specific segments end up negatively affecting a much broader set of economic activities. In addition, they tend to frustrate tariffs that are specifically set on countries of origin, on a bilateral basis: for example, much of Chinese production has moved to Vietnam, Thailand and other countries rather than to the U.S.

Is the negative effect temporary, lasting only while local production does not adjust to the new context via new investments? It should be noted that adaptation can also reinforce the negative impact sides on jobs. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the immediate, short-term consequences of the tariff escalation would wind down over time.

The Fed study of the effects of tariff escalation did not even encompass the broader negative indirect effects, namely the depressive effect on manufacturing investments and economic growth in the U.S. and abroad generated by trade policy uncertainty, affecting particularly capital goods industries and world trade. Such an impact on investments was one of the major factors explaining the global economic growth in 2019 as the lowest since the global financial crisis.

But hasn’t the U.S. GDP and employment performance remained favorable since the onset of the tariff escalation? That has occurred for other reasons, such as the fiscal stimulus provided by the tax reform of the early Trump administration, the pivotal turn of the Fed’s monetary policy, and the buoyancy of domestic consumption and services. It would have been otherwise if it had depended on the manufacturing industry – Chart 2 – and trade policy of the Trump administration.

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Finally, it is worth remembering the mistake of finding it possible to shrink the U.S. current account deficit via trade measures upon countries with which it has negative bilateral balances. The current account deficit reflects the difference between domestic “absorption” (consumption and investment) and local production. In the absence of miraculous increases of the latter, the reduction of the current deficit would only occur with recession and falling domestic wages, just the opposite of the promise.

Otaviano Canuto, based in Washington, D.C, is a senior fellow at thePolicy Center for the New South, a nonresident senior fellow atBrookings Institution, and principal of theCenter for Macroeconomics and Development. He is a former vice-president and a former executive director at the World Bank, a former executive director at the International Monetary Fund and a former vice-president at the Inter-American Development Bank. He is also a former deputy minister for international affairs at Brazil’s Ministry of Finance and a former professor of economics at University of São Paulo and University of Campinas, Brazil.

Comments (3)
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This is kind of a nonsense study. US manufacturing employment (the key word here is employment) is going to continue hollowing out 100% regardless of what happens with tariffs or trade, since that is the natural trajectory even if you have a closed economy model with improvements in automation / productivity / efficiency / innovation / competitiveness. US manufacturing employment will continue going down with or without tariffs. It's not employment you should be measuring, it should be output. But if you do want to look at employment (for more domestic political reasons, or whatever reason) then you need to try and model how the tarriffs are effecting the rate of change of the decline, is it declining at a faster rate or slower rate? And even then you can't really do this only over a few years, at the very least you need a longer time horizon before you can get anything close to resembling an accurate judgement on this specific issue. Anyhow perhaps I'm looking at it more in the grand-scheme / larger macro sense, I'll be more interested in studying output, since regardless the US cannot just lose these industrial output capabilities. Free markets don't actually exist, world is moving away from Liberalism IR in many senses of the word (and moving to Realism, which has been trending this way for last 20ish years), security implications would cost hundreds of billions (or trillions), it's impossible to really cost it all. The issue is immensely complex, I haven't read a single study that really covers it all across multiple domains (which is how it should really be studied, instead they just focus on very basic single issues (variables), like employment).