NEW YORK ( TheStreet) -- Emirates announced a 2-for-1 sale on flights to Dubai, recalling an incident from the hyper-competitive days of U.S. aviation when American (AAL) - Get Report CEO Bob Crandall instituted a 2-for-1 sale of his own.

In April 1992, Crandall was angered because Northwest Airlines, followed by others, sought to undercut "value" pricing, his innovative effort to simplify airline pricing. So Crandall offered 2-for-1 tickets on every flight.

"What resulted in the summer of 1992 was the biggest fare sale in industry history," wrote Dan Reed, in the new book, American Airlines, US Airways and the Creation of the World's Largest Airline, which I co-authored.

On Monday, Emirates announced a 2-for-1 sale for flights between its nine U.S. gateways and its hub at Dubai International Airport. The round-trip economy class fare for two is $1,299, plus taxes and fees. Tickets must be bought by 2:59 a.m. EDT on Friday, March 13 -- that's 11:59 p.m. PDT -- for travel between March 24 and Dec. 10.

Emirates' U.S. gateways are Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Seattle and Washington.

"There is no better time to visit Dubai," said Matthias Schmid, Emirates U.S. vice president for sales, in a prepared statement. Although summertime highs average 106 degrees, with an average overnight low of 86, Dubai offers beaches, horse races, water parks, an old town and a lot of high-end shopping.

A trip to Dubai also would provide the opportunity to find out what all the fuss is about.

The Emirates sale comes at a time when the three Gulf carriers -- Emirates, Etihad and Qatar -- have been in the news in the month since American, Delta and United first began to circulate a report documenting how the governments of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the two largest emirates, provided about $39 billion in subsidies to the airlines -- Qatar, the flag carrier of Qatar; and Etihad and Emirates, flag carriers of the UAE.

The subsidies, of course, enable all manners of spending while diminishing the importance of making a profit from operations. For Emirates, in fact, simply bringing people to Dubai to spend money has value. The airline and the emirate of Dubai "have an integrated revenue stream," said aviation consultant Bob Mann.

Mann said 2-for-1 pricing provides an indication of excess capacity between the U.S. and Dubai. After all, most passengers on the Gulf carriers are not going to the Gulf. Rather, they are going to Abu Dhabi, Doha and Dubai in order to change planes.

Load factors for the three carriers are likely far higher on flights to and from India and Asia than on flights to and from the U.S. Mann said, noting: "They have a capacity imbalance. They are full year-round west of the hubs with contract labor, but they have excess capacity for the east side of the hubs (where) they are trying to stimulate traffic."

While the period to purchase the tickets is brief, flying is permitted anytime during the next nine months, an extremely extended period, which "validates the fact that there is excess capacity year-round," Mann said.

As for the comparison with Crandall, travel writer Joe Brancatelli called Emirates' sale "Crandall light.

"This is not like when Crandall tried to discipline the entire country. It's almost as if (Emirates CEO) Tim Clark is saying, 'OK, we'll get our O&D traffic up to prove to you guys that we're not just stealing connections from you.'" Origin and destination, or O&D, traffic refers to passengers who do not make connections.

"A fare sale that only covers O&D Dubai doesn't hurt the U.S. carriers, (who) only have two flights to Dubai," Brancatelli said.

In 1992, "American attempted to solve the industry's perennial problem: hyper-competitive, self-destructive pricing schemes featuring dizzying numbers of fares for every flight," Dan Reed wrote. American's Value Plan had just four pricing categories, all set at percentage valuations related to standard coach.

Because much of the plan's pricing fell below existing levels, "rival characters reacted emotionally," Reed wrote. "Northwest, followed first by Continental and later by others, tried to undercut Value Plan pricing in niche markets. In response, American did exactly what Crandall had warned it would do, lowering all of its fares on all flights. American also matched and expanded on Northwest's limited deal allowing a child to fly free with a parent, offering a simple 2-for-1 deal with no limitations on the age or identity of the second traveler.

"Consequently, every American alive, it seemed, took a flying vacation in the summer of 1992," Reed wrote.

This article is commentary by an independent contributor. At the time of publication, the author held no positions in the stocks mentioned.