The Starbucks call also had a denouement feel about it. There was a sense among the analysts that Starbucks can't possibly exceed what it's done already. At one point it got so difficult that Howard Schultz mentioned that the "tension between us and you regarding comparable growth guidance" had gotten out of hand and it would be irresponsible to say that Starbucks will beat the 8% comps in the Americas and 7% overall.
Lost in the shuffle were the fabulous packaged-goods initiatives, the Teavana rollout and the day-part expansion. Instead the mob wanted facts and figures about how the Boulange food rollout was impacting comparable-store sales and Starbucks management just wouldn't go there. It didn't seem to matter to the analysts one bit that Starbucks may actually be using its stores as launching pads for supermarket aisle takeaway and for lunch and dinner, a true monetization of bricks and mortar.
Frankly, I found the Q&A here of the total nit-pick variety, but I respect the fact that most of these analysts are trying to build models and they are flummoxed about how to interpret all of these initiatives within the confines of the spreadsheet, a common problem when it comes to this chain.
How do you value loyalty? How do you put a price tag on affinity cards and mobile? They don't know how to do it, so the credit where credit should be isn't there. Instead, the focus is on kinks in new initiatives even though Howard took pains to point out that the Panera problem -- slow throughput on hard-to-make specials -- and new products isn't an issue for Starbucks.